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This paper explores the interaction between fiscal policy and unemployment. It develops a dynamic
economic model in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and public spending
increases. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. In the
context of this model, the paper analyzes the simultaneous determination of fiscal policy and unemployment
in long run equilibrium. Outcomes with both a benevolent government and political decision-making
















An important role for ﬁscal policy is the mitigation of unemployment and stabilization of the
economy.1 Despite sceptism from some branches of the economics profession, politicians and
p o l i c y - m a k e r st e n dt ob eo p t i m i s t i ca b o u tt h ep o t e n t i a lﬁscal policy has in this regard. Around
the world, countries facing downturns continue to pursue a variety of ﬁscal strategies, ranging
from tax cuts to public works projects. Nonetheless, politicians’ willingness to use ﬁscal policy to
aggressively ﬁght unemployment is tempered by high levels of debt. The main political barrier to
deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cuts and public spending increases appears to be concern about the long-term
burden of high debt.
This extensive practical experience with ﬁscal policy raises a number of basic positive public
ﬁnance questions. In general, how do employment concerns impact the setting of taxes and public
spending? When will government employ ﬁscal stimulus plans? What determines the size of these
plans and how does this depend upon the economy’s debt position? What will be the mix of tax
cuts and public spending increases in stimulus plans and how will they be ﬁnanced? What will
be the overall eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy in terms of reducing unemployment?
This paper presents a theory of the interaction between ﬁscal policy and unemployment that
sheds light on these questions. The starting point for the theory is a simple dynamic economic
model in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and public spending
increases. Such policies are ﬁscally costly, but can be ﬁnanced by issuing debt. This model is
used to analyze the simultaneous determination of ﬁscal policy and unemployment in long run
equilibrium. Outcomes with both a benevolent government and political decision-making are
considered. With political decision-making, the model delivers a simple positive theory of ﬁscal
policy and unemployment.
The economic model has a public and private sector. The private sector consists of entrepre-
neurs who hire workers to produce a private good. The public sector hires workers to produce a
public good. Public production is ﬁnanced by a tax on the private sector. The government can
also borrow and lend in the bond market. The private sector is aﬀected by exogenous shocks (oil
price hikes, for example) which impact entrepreneurs’ demand for labor. Unemployment can arise
because of a downwardly rigid real wage. In the presence of unemployment, reducing taxes in-
1 For an informative recent discussion of this role see Auerbach, Gale, and Harris (2010).
1creases private sector hiring, while increasing public production creates public sector jobs. Thus,
tax cuts and increases in public production reduce unemployment. However, both actions are
costly for the government.
We show that in this model there would be no unemployment in the long run with a benevolent
government. Moreover, the mix of public and private outputs would be optimal. The way in which
the government achieves this ﬁrst best outcome is by accumulating bond holdings. In the long run,
in every period the government hires suﬃcient public sector workers to provide the Samuelson level
of the public good and sets taxes so that the private sector has the incentive to hire the remaining
workers. When the private sector is experiencing negative shocks, these taxes are suﬃciently low
that tax revenues fall short of the costs of public good provision. The earnings from government
bond holdings are then used to ﬁnance this shortfall.
The benevolent government solution is provocative in showing how governments can use ﬁscal
policy to completely circumvent the ineﬃciencies stemming from labor market frictions in the
long run. The lesson suggested by the analysis is that no satisfactory theory of unemployment can
abstract from how ﬁscal policy is chosen. Nonetheless, when interpreted as a positive theory, the
solution is less interesting and this motivates considering political decision-making. To introduce
this, we follow Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) in assuming that policy decisions are made in
each period by a legislature consisting of representatives from diﬀerent political districts. We also
incorporate the friction that legislators can transfer revenues back to their districts.
With political decision-making, the government has no stock of bonds and, when the private
sector experiences negative shocks, unemployment arises. Moreover, when these shocks occur,
government mitigates unemployment with stimulus plans that are ﬁnanced by increases in debt.
These equilibrium stimulus plans typically involve both tax cuts and public production increases.
When choosing such plans, the government balances the beneﬁts of reducing unemployment with
the costs of distorting the private-public output mix. In normal times, when the private sector is
not experiencing negative shocks, the government reduces debt until it reaches a ﬂoor level. The
existence of this ﬂoor level prevents bond accumulation as in the benevolent government solution.
Even in normal times, the private-public output mix is distorted and unemployment can arise,
depending on the economic and political fundamentals. With or without negative shocks, when
there is unemployment, it will be higher the larger the government’s debt level. High debt levels
are therefore associated with high unemployment levels.
2While there is a vast theoretical literature on ﬁscal policy, we are not aware of any work
that systematically addresses the positive public ﬁnance questions that motivate this paper. Neo-
classical theories of ﬁscal policy, such as the tax smoothing approach, assume frictionless labor
markets and thus abstract from unemployment.2 Traditional Keynesian models incorporate un-
employment and allow consideration of the multiplier eﬀects of changes in government spending
and taxes. However, these models are static and do not incorporate debt and the costs of debt
ﬁnancing.3 This limitation also applies to the literature in optimal taxation which has explored
how optimal policies are chosen in the presence of involuntary unemployment.4 The modern
new Keynesian literature with its sophisticated dynamic general equilibrium models with sticky
prices typically treats ﬁscal policy as exogenous.5 Papers in this tradition that do focus on ﬁscal
policy, analyze how government spending shocks impact the economy and quantify the possible
magnitude of multiplier eﬀects.6
Addressing the questions we are interested in requires a simple and tractable dynamic model.
In creating such a model, we have made a number of strong assumptions. First, we employ a model
without money and therefore abstract from monetary policy. This means that we cannot consider
the important issue of whether the government would prefer to use monetary policy to achieve
its policy objectives.7 Second, we obtain unemployment by simply assuming a downwardly
rigid real wage, as opposed to a more sophisticated micro-founded story.8 This means that our
analysis abstracts from any possible eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the underlying friction generating
unemployment. Third, the source of cyclical ﬂuctuations in our economy comes from the supply
2 The tax smoothing approach studies how governments use distortionary taxes and debt to ﬁnance government
spending in the face of uncertainty. Key papers in the literature are Aiyagari et al (2002), Barro (1979), and Lucas
and Stokey (1983).
3 For a nice exposition of the traditional Keynesian approach to ﬁscal policy see Peacock and Shaw (1971).
Blinder and Solow (1973) discuss some of the complications associated with debt ﬁnance and extend the IS-LM
model to try and capture some of these.
4 This literature includes papers by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), Dreze (1985), Marchand, Pestieau,
and Wibaut (1989), and Roberts (1982).
5 See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
6 See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), Hall (2009), Mertens and Ravn (2010), and
Woodford (2010).
7 In an interesting recent contribution, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2011) study optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
in a two period general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Their analysis of ﬁscal policy diﬀe r sf r o mo u r sb e c a u s e
they assume lump sum taxation so that Ricardian Equivalence holds.
8 There is a literature incorporating theories of unemployment into dynamic general equilibrium models (see
Gali (1996) for a general discussion). Modelling options include matching and search frictions (Andolfatto 1996),
union wage setting (Ardagna 2007), and eﬃciency wages (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999).
3rather than the demand side. In our model, recessions arise because negative shocks to the private
sector reduce the demand for labor. Labor market frictions prevent the wage from adjusting
and the result is unemployment. This vision diﬀers from the traditional and new Keynesian
perspectives that emphasize the importance of shocks to consumer demand.9
While these strong assumptions undoubtedly represent limitations of our analysis, we nonethe-
less feel that our model provides an interesting framework in which to study activist ﬁscal policy.
First, the model incorporates the two broad ways in which government can create jobs: indirectly
by reducing taxes on the private sector, or directly through increasing public production. Sec-
ond, the model allows consideration of two conceptually diﬀerent types of activist ﬁscal policy:
balanced-budget policies wherein tax cuts are ﬁnanced by public spending decreases or visa versa,
and deﬁcit-ﬁnanced policies wherein tax cuts and/or spending increases are ﬁnanced by increases
in public debt. Third, the mechanism by which taxes inﬂuence private sector employment in the
model is consonant with arguments that are commonplace in the policy arena. For example, the
main argument behind objections to eliminating the Bush tax cuts for those making $250,000
and above, was that it would lead small businesses to reduce their hiring during a time of high
unemployment. Fourth, the mechanism by which high debt levels are costly for the economy also
captures arguments that are commonly made by politicians and policy-makers. Higher debt levels
imply larger debt service costs which require either greater taxes on the private sector and/or lower
public spending. These policies, in turn, have negative consequences for jobs and the economy.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Sec-
tion 3 studies ﬁscal policy and unemployment with a benevolent government. Section 4 introduces
political decision-making, and Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
The environment We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy in which there are two ﬁnal goods;
ap r i v a t eg o o d and a public good . There are two types of citizens; entrepreneurs and workers.
Entrepreneurs produce the private good by combining labor  and an input  with their own eﬀort.
Workers are endowed with 1 unit of labor each period which they supply inelastically. The public
9 In the new Keynesian literature demand shocks are created by stochastic discount rates (see, for example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009)). In Mankiw and Weinzerl’s (2011) two period model, a demand shock
in period one arises from a reduction in period two productivity which causes households to have lower expectations
about period two income.
4good is produced by the government using labor.
There are  entrepreneurs and  workers where  +  = 1. Each entrepreneur produces
with the Leontief production technology  = min{} where  represents the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort and  is a productivity parameter. The idea underlying this production technology is that
when an entrepreneur hires more workers he must put in more eﬀort to manage them. The public
good production technology is  = .
Workers’ per period payoﬀ function is  +  ln where  measures the relative value of the
public good. Entrepreneurs’ per period payoﬀ function is  +  ln − 22 where the third term
represents the disutility of providing entrepreneurial eﬀort. All individuals discount the future at
rate 
There are markets for the private good, the input, and labor. The private good is the numeraire.
The input is supplied by foreign suppliers and has an exogenous but variable price .W eh a v e
in mind an input essential for production, such as energy. Each period, this price can take on
o n eo ft w ov a l u e s or ,w h e r e is less than  and  is less than  − .W ew i l ls a y
that the economy is in the low cost state when  =  and the high cost state when  = .T h e
probability of the high cost state is . The wage is denoted  and the labor market operates under
the constraint that the wage cannot go below an exogenous minimum .10 This friction is the
source of unemployment. There is also a market for risk-free one period bonds. The assumption
that citizens have quasi-linear utility implies that the equilibrium interest rate on these bonds is
 =1  − 1.
To ﬁnance its activities, the government taxes entrepreneurs’ incomes at rate . It can also
borrow and lend in the bond market. Government debt is denoted by  and new borrowing by 0.
The government is also able to distribute surplus revenues to citizens via lump sum transfers.
Market equilibrium At the beginning of each period, the cost state of the economy is revealed.
The government repays existing debt and chooses the tax rate, public good, new borrowing, and
transfers. It does this taking into account how its policies impact the market and the need to
10 We make this assumption to get a simple and tractable model of unemployment. While  could be literally
interpreted as a statutory minimum wage, what we are really trying to capture are the sort of rigidities identiﬁed
i nt h es u r v e yw o r ko fB e w l e y( 1 9 9 9 ) . T h ea s s u m p t i o no fs o m et y p eo fr e a lw a g er i g i d i t yi sc o m m o ni nt h e
macroeconomics literature (see, for example, Blanchard and Gali (2007), Hall (2005), and Michaillat (2011)) and
a large empirical literature investigates the extent of real wage rigidity in practice (see, for example, Barwell and
Schweitzer (2007), Dickens et al (2007), and Holden and Wulfsberg (2009)).
5balance its budget.
To understand how policies impact the market, assume the cost state is ,t h et a xr a t ei s,
and the public good level is . Given a wage rate , each entrepreneur chooses hiring, the input,
and eﬀort, to maximize his utility
max
()




Obviously, the solution involves  =  = . Substituting this into the objective function and
maximizing with respect to  reveals that  =( 1− )( − ) where  =  − . Aggregate
labor demand from the private sector is therefore (1 − )( − ). Labor demand from the
public sector is  and labor supply is . Setting demand equal to supply, the market clearing
wage is




The minimum wage will bind if this wage is less than . In this case, the equilibrium wage is 
and the unemployment rate is
 =
 −  − (1 − )( − )

 (3)




















 if  ≤  + (
−
(1−))




When the minimum wage is binding, the unemployment rate is increasing in . Higher taxes cause
entrepreneurs to put in less eﬀort and this reduces private sector demand for workers. The unem-
ployment rate is also decreasing in  b e c a u s et op r o d u c em o r ep u b l i cg o o d s ,t h eg o v e r n m e n tm u s t
hire more workers. When the minimum wage is not binding, the equilibrium wage is decreasing
in  and increasing in .
Each entrepreneur earns proﬁts of  =( 1−)( −)2. Assuming he receives no govern-
ment transfers and consumes his proﬁts, an entrepreneur obtains a period payoﬀ of
 =
( − )2(1 − )2
2
+  ln (6)
6Jobs are randomly allocated among workers and so each worker obtains an expected period payoﬀ
 =( 1− ) +  ln (7)
Again, this assumes that the worker receives no transfers and simply consumes his earnings.
Aggregate output of the private good is  = (1 − )( − ) Substituting in the





(1 − )( − ) if  ≤  + (
−
(1−))




Observe that the tax rate has no impact on private sector output when the minimum wage
constraint is not binding. This is because labor is inelastically supplied and as a consequence the
wage adjusts to ensure full employment. A higher tax rate just leads to an oﬀsetting reduction
in the wage rate. However, when there is unemployment, tax hikes reduce private sector output
because they lead entrepreneurs to reduce eﬀort. Public good production has no eﬀect on private
output when there is unemployment, but reduces it when there is full employment.
T h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t Having understood how markets respond to government
policies, we can now formalize the government’s budget constraint. Tax revenue is
()=()=(1 − )( − )2 (9)
Total government revenue is therefore ()+0. The cost of public good provision and debt
repayment is  + (1 + ). The budget surplus available for transfers is the diﬀerence between
()+0 and  + (1 + ). The government budget constraint is that this budget surplus
be non-negative, which requires that
() −  ≥ (1 + ) − 0 (10)
There is also an upper limit  on the amount of debt the government can issue. This limit
is motivated by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold bonds that they know will not be repaid.
If, in steady state, the government were borrowing an amount  such that the interest payments
exceeded the maximum possible tax revenues in the high cost state; i.e.,   max (),
then, if the economy were in the high cost state, it would be unable to repay the debt even if it
provided no public goods or transfers. The upper limit on debt is therefore  =m a x  ().
73 Benevolent government
It will prove instructive to break down the analysis of the benevolent government’s solution into
two parts. First, we study the static optimal policy problem for this economy. Thus, we ignore
debt and, in the spirit of the optimal taxation literature, assume that the government faces
an exogenous revenue requirement. Having understood how the static solution depends on the
revenue requirement, we then introduce debt and study the dynamic policy choice problem. In the
dynamic problem, the government’s revenue requirement corresponds to the diﬀerence between
debt repayment and new borrowing (as in (10)). Solving the dynamic model endogenizes the
government’s revenue requirement and completes the picture of the solution.
3.1 The static problem
The static optimal policy problem is to choose a tax rate  and a level of public good  to maximize
aggregate citizen utility subject to the requirement that revenues net of public production costs
cover a revenue requirement . To allow for the possibility of surpluses or deﬁcits when debt
is introduced, we assume that the revenue requirement can be positive or negative. Under the







() −  −  +  + 





What makes this problem non-standard is the possibility of unemployment.11 The problem
is simpliﬁed by noting that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the government always
sets taxes suﬃciently high so that the equilibrium wage equals . As noted earlier, taxes are non-
distortionary when the wage exceeds  and the government has the ability to make transfers. Thus,
if the wage exceeded , there would be no change in aggregate utility if the government raised
taxes and simply redistributed the additional tax revenues back to the citizens. This observation
11 With no downward rigidity in the wage, the solution to this problem is very simple. The government provides
the Samuelson level of the public good and taxes the private sector suﬃcient to ﬁn a n c ei t .T h ew a g ea d j u s t st o
e n s u r ef u l le m p l o y m e n ta n da ne ﬃcient allocation of resources. In the dynamic policy choice problem, there is no
role for government debt.















2 +  ln − 







where () is the output of the private good when the tax rate is  and the wage rate is  (see
t h et o pl i n eo f( 8 ) ) .
Problem (12) has a simple interpretation. The objective function is the aggregate surplus
generated by outputs ()a n d, less the revenue requirement.12 The ﬁrst inequality is the
government budget constraint under the assumption that the wage is . The second inequality is
the resource constraint: it requires that the demand for labor at wage  is less than or equal to
t h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r s.13
A diagrammatic approach will be helpful in explaining the solution to problem (12). Without
loss of generality, we assume that  is less than or equal to the maximum possible tax revenue
which is (12).14 We also assume that unemployment would result if the government faced
the maximal revenue requirement.15 To understand our diagrammatic approach, consider Fig.
1.A. The tax rate is measured on the horizontal axis and the public good on the vertical. The
upward sloping line is the resource constraint. Using the expression for ()f r o m( 8 ) ,t h i sl i n e
is described by
 =  − (1 − )( − ) (13)
At points along this line, there is full employment at the wage . Policies must be on or below
this line and points below are associated with unemployment.
The upward sloping, convex curves represent the government’s indiﬀerence curves.T h e s e
curves tell us the government’s preferences over diﬀerent ()p a i r s . I n d i ﬀerence curves satisfy
12 T h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rt h es u r p l u sg e n e r a t e db y()( t h eﬁrst two terms) reﬂects the fact that the surplus
associated with the private good consists of the consumption beneﬁt si tg e n e r a t e sl e s st h ec o s t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h e
input and entrepreneurial eﬀort necessary to produce it.
13 This constraint is required to ensure that the equilibrium wage is indeed .
14 The revenue maximizing tax rate is 12 and the maximum revenue requirement is ( − )4.O f
course, if  were higher than this level, the problem would have no solution. In the dynamic model, however, this
case will never arise.
15 If the government faces the maximal revenue requirement it will set the tax rate equal to 12 and provide
no public good. Private sector employment will be ( − )2 and there will be no public sector employment.
Thus, this assumption amounts to the requirement that  exceeds ( − )2.
9Figure 1:












+  ln =  (14)
Higher indiﬀerence curves are associated with higher utility levels, so utility is increasing as we
move North-West. The indiﬀerence curves become ﬂatter as we move South-East and the public
good becomes more scarce.
The tangency point between the indiﬀerence curves and the full employment line deﬁnes the
ﬁrst best policies (

). When these policies are in place, there is both full employment at wage
 and the optimal mix of private and public outputs. The public good level 
 is determined by
the usual Samuelsonian considerations. The associated tax rate 
 provides entrepreneurs with
just the right incentive to employ those workers not employed in the public sector at the wage
rate .I nF i g .1 . A ,t h et a xr a t e
 is positive, but there is nothing to prevent a subsidy being
necessary to achieve full employment.
In the remaining panels of Figure 1, we add the government’s budget line -t h el o c u so fp o i n t s
that satisfy the budget constraint with equality. The budget line associated with revenue require-








Policies must be on or below this line and points below are associated with positive transfers. Each
budget line is hump shaped, with peak at  =1 2. Increasing the revenue requirement shifts down
the budget line but does not change the slope. Panels B, C, and D of Figure 1 represent increasing
revenue requirements.
T h ef e a s i b l es e to f( ) pairs for the optimal policy problem are those that lie below both the
budget and resource constraints. This set is represented by the gray, cross hatched areas in Figure
1. Observe that the feasible set is (weakly) convex which makes the problem well-behaved.
With this diagrammatic apparatus in place, we can now explain the optimal policies. The
government would ideally like to choose the ﬁrst best policies (

). This is feasible when the
revenue requirement  is less than 
 = (
)−
 as in Fig. 1.B. The surplus revenues 
 −
can be rebated back to citizens in the form of transfers. In this range of revenue requirements, the
optimal tax and public good levels are independent of  and changes in  are absorbed by changes
in transfers.
11When  is higher than 
,t h eﬁrst best policies are too expensive for the government. To meet
its revenue requirement, the government must reduce public good provision and/or raise taxes. In
making this decision, the government balances the costs of two types of distortions: unemployment
and having the wrong mix of public and private outputs. Starting from the ﬁr s tb e s tp o s i t i o no f
full employment and the optimal output mix, the costs of distorting the output mix are second
order, while the costs of unemployment are ﬁrst order. As a result, for revenue requirements only
slightly higher than 
, the government will preserve full employment by appropriate adjustment




The situation is illustrated in Fig. 1.C. The government can achieve full employment by




 ()] with associated level of public good given by (13),
where 
−
 ()a n d
+
 ()a r ed e ﬁned by the left and right intersections of the budget line and resource
constraint. When 




 ()], as in Fig. 1.C, the optimal policies
are the tax rate 
−
 () with associated public good level 
−
 (). This policy combination involves
the least distortion in the output mix consistent with achieving full employment. When 
 lies




 ()], as in Fig. 2.B, the optimal policies are the tax rate

+
 () with associated public good level 
+
 (). Notice that in the former case, the government
distorts the output mix towards public production and in the latter it distorts away from public
production. These cases also generate diﬀerent comparative static implications. In the former
case, as the revenue requirement increases, taxes and public production increase, as illustrated in
Fig. 2.A. In the latter, taxes and public production decrease as illustrated in Fig. 2.B. Intuitively,
in the former case, the government generates a ﬁscal surplus by raising taxes on the private sector
and hiring the displaced workers in the public sector. In the latter, it generates a ﬁscal surplus by
laying oﬀ public sector workers and using tax cuts to incentivize the private sector to hire them.
For revenue requirements signiﬁcantly higher than 
, maintaining full employment requires a
larger distortion in the output mix. Indeed, for suﬃciently high revenue requirements, as in Fig.
1.D, maintaining full employment is not possible. Eventually, therefore, increased ﬁscal pressure
must result in unemployment. In the Appendix, we prove that there is a cut point ∗
  
 at
which the government abandons the eﬀort to maintain full employment. For revenue requirements
higher than ∗
, the resource constraint is not binding and the optimal policies are at the tangency
of the budget line and the indiﬀerence curve. These policies are denoted by (b ()b ()) and are
12Figure 2:
illustrated in Fig. 1.D. As the revenue requirement climbs above ∗
, the tax rate increases and
the public production level decreases, so (b ()b ()) moves to the South-East. Unemployment
also increases.
Summarizing this discussion, we have the following description of the optimal policies.
Proposition 1 There exists a revenue requirement ∗
  
 such that the solution to problem (12)
has the following properties.
• If  ≤ 
, the optimal policies are (

) and involve full employment with the optimal
output mix. In this range, the optimal policies are independent of the revenue requirement
and increases in  are absorbed by reductions in government transfers.
• If  ∈ (
 ∗








 ()) and the output mix is distorted in
favor of the public good. In this range, as  increases, both public production and the tax
rate increase. If 
 
+




 ()) and the output mix is
distorted in favor of the private good. As  increases, both public production and the tax rate
decrease.
• If  ∗
, the optimal policies are (b ()b ()) and involve unemployment. In this range, as
 increases, public production decreases, the tax rate increases, and unemployment increases.
13Proposition 1 tells us how taxes, public good production, and employment in each state depend
on the government’s revenue requirement.16 Ap r e m i s eo ft h ea n a l y s i si st h a tt h er e v e n u e
requirement is exogenous. In a dynamic model, however,  is endogenous, depending on the
amount of government debt that needs to be repaid and new borrowing.17 Proposition 1,
therefore, leaves a key question unanswered. In which of the three cases described should we
expect the government to be in the long run?
3.2 Dynamics
We now bring debt into the picture. Intuitively, debt should be helpful since it allows government
to transfer revenues from good times in which low costs create robust private sector proﬁts and
labor demand, to bad times in which high costs result in a depressed private sector. In bad
times, the revenues transferred will reduce ﬁscal pressure and permit policy changes which reduce
unemployment and distortions in the output mix. The beneﬁts from these changes will exceed
the costs associated with raising revenue in good times because the distortions created by tax
increases and public good reductions are lower in good times. Indeed, as noted earlier, taxation
is non-distortionary when the minimum wage constraint is not binding.
The dynamic problem is to choose a time path of policies to maximize aggregate lifetime citizen
utility. Since in equilibrium citizens are indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across
time, their lifetime utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoﬀ they
would obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period. Ignoring
these initial bond holdings, the problem can therefore be formulated recursively as





(0 )+ +  + 0(0)





where () is aggregate lifetime citizen utility in state  with initial debt level  and (·) denotes
the budget surplus available for transfers.18 Under this recursive formulation, in each period,
16 It is important to note that the solution described in Proposition 1 reﬂects our (w.l.o.g.) assumption that
the government sets a tax rate such that the wage is . When  is less than 
, the government could equally
w e l lr e d u c et h et a xr a t ea n dl e tt h ew a g er a t er i s ea b o v e, compensating for the lost tax revenues by reducing
transfers. Thus, in the case of full employment with no distortions, the optimal tax rate and level of transfers are
not uniquely deﬁned. In all the other cases, the solution must be exactly as described in Proposition 1.
17 Speciﬁcally, from (10), we see that  will equal (1 + ) − 0.
18 That is, (0 )=()+0 −  − (1 + )
14given the cost state  and initial debt level , the government chooses the current tax rate ,t h e
public good level , and new borrowing 0. Transfers are determined residually by (0 ).
As in the static problem, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the government always
sets taxes suﬃciently high that the wage is equal to . Thus, proceeding as in the static case and
substituting (1 + ) − 0 for , we may rewrite the government’s problem as














2 +  ln + 0 − (1 + )+0(0)
 (0) ≥ 0,  +
()





To focus the analysis on the natural case of interest, we assume that when debt is zero the
government is able to achieve the ﬁrst best without borrowing in the low but not the high cost




  0  (
) − 

Recalling the deﬁnition of 
, the critical revenue requirement delineating the ﬁrst and second
cases of Proposition 1, Assumption 1 implies that 
 is negative and 
 is positive.
A solution to problem (17) consists of optimal policy functions {() () 0
()} for each state
 and value functions ()a n d(). By standard methods, it can be shown that there exists a
solution and that the associated value functions are concave and diﬀerentiable. Corresponding to
any solution, we can deﬁne ()=( 1+) − 0
() to be the revenue requirement implied by the
optimal policies in state  with initial debt level .L e t t i n g( 
()
()) denote the optimal static
policies described in Proposition 1, it is clear that (() ()) will equal (
(())
(())).
As discussed above, therefore, the key issue is to identify how the revenue requirement behaves in
the long run. This will tell us which of the three cases described in Proposition 1 will arise.
To study the long run, note that given a solution to problem (17), for any initial debt level 0
and sequence of shocks hi, we can associate a sequence of policies h  0
i.20 The associated
sequence of revenue requirements is then hi where for all ,  =( 1+)0
−1 − 0
.T h eq u e s t i o n
19 In terms of the fundamental parameters of the model this assumption can be shown to be equivalent to:
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15is how these sequences behave as  becomes large. In fact, we can show that the probability that
 is less than or equal to 
 converges to one as  becomes large. From Proposition 1, we may
conclude that, in the long run, the relevant case is the ﬁrst. Thus we have:
Proposition 2 With a benevolent government, the economy converges to full employment with
the optimal output mix.
In the long run, therefore, in cost state , taxes and public production are (

). In the
high cost state ( = ) public production is higher and tax revenues are lower. The increase in
public production occurs because, while the beneﬁt of public goods is state independent, the cost
of the private good is higher. Lower tax revenues also reﬂect the fact that the private sector is less
proﬁtable.21 Despite lower net tax revenues, the government is able to implement the ﬁrst best
policies in the high cost state in the long run because it has accumulated suﬃcient bond holdings.
Precisely how the government ﬁnances its activities is not tied down by the theory because
there are multiple solutions to problem (17) and ﬁnancing will depend on the details of the
solution. The simplest solution is that the government gradually accumulates bonds until its debt
level reaches 
 (recall that 
 is negative by Assumption 1). Once debt reaches this level,
the steady state revenue requirement is 
. This negative revenue requirement reﬂects the fact
that the government is earning interest on its bond holdings. In the high cost state, these interest
earnings are just suﬃcient to ﬁnance the shortfall in net tax revenues. In the low cost state, the
interest earnings are rebated back to the citizens in a transfer along with the surplus net tax
revenues 
.22 Intuitively, other solutions are possible because once debt has reached 
,t h e
government can further reduce it temporarily with no eﬀect on citizens’ long run utility.
Proposition 2 strikes us as an interesting result. The conclusion that in the long run a benevo-
lent government can employ ﬁscal policy to achieve full employment seems likely to hold in many
models of unemployment. After all, in environments where unemployment is caused by a rigidity,
it can typically be overcome by appropriate corrective subsidies or taxes. If government can ﬁnance
21 The impact on the tax rate of moving from the low cost to the high cost state is ambiguous. On the one
hand, to hire any given number of workers, entrepreneurs need to be provided with lower taxes in the high cost
state since workers are less proﬁtable. On the other hand, entrepreneurs need to hire fewer workers because public
production increases.
22 As noted in footnote #16, in the low cost state, the government could equally well reduce the tax rate and let
t h ew a g er a t er i s ea b o v e, compensating for the lost tax revenues by reducing transfers. In this case, we would
observe wage reductions rather than transfer reductions when the economy moves from the low to the high cost
state.
16such corrective programs with lump sum taxation, unemployment can be eliminated immediately.
But even when only distortionary taxes are feasible, unemployment can still be eliminated in the
long run if the government can accumulate assets as illustrated in Proposition 2. This suggests
that in many environments the real cause of long run unemployment lies in the policy-making
process rather than frictions in the market. The general lesson hinted at, therefore, is that no
satisfactory theory of unemployment can abstract from how ﬁscal policy is chosen.
The logic underlying Proposition 2 is similar to that arising in tax smoothing models. In these
models, government ﬁnances spending with a distortionary tax and uses debt to smooth tax rates
across periods. The need to smooth is created by shocks to government spending needs and/or by
cyclical variation in revenue yields. In the case of spending shocks, for example, tax smoothing
requires the government to transfer revenues from times of low spending needs (peacetime) to
times of high spending needs (wartime). The revenues transferred permit tax reductions and the
beneﬁts from these reductions exceed the costs associated with higher taxes in peacetime because
the distortionary costs of taxation are convex. Under certain conditions, the optimal policy in
these models is for the government to accumulate a stock of bonds which eventually allows it to
ﬁnance government spending with no taxation (Aiyagari, et al 2002). All distortions are therefore
eliminated in the long run. While the nature of the distortions arising in our model are very
diﬀerent from those arising in a tax smoothing model, the basic forces driving optimal policy are
the same.23 The role for debt is to smooth distortions across periods and, in the long run, it is
optimal to completely eliminate distortions.
4 Political decision-making
The lesson from the previous section is that, at least in this model, introducing political decision-
making is necessary to obtain an interesting positive theory of ﬁscal policy and unemployment.
Our strategy for doing this follows Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008). Thus, we assume that the
economy is divided into  identically sized political districts, each a microcosm of the economy as
a whole. In each period, policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of  representatives,
one from each district. Each representative wishes to maximize the aggregate utility of the citizens
in his district. In addition to choosing taxes, public goods, and borrowing, the legislature must
23 The distortions arising in a tax smoothing model are the standard deadweight costs of taxation.
17also choose how to divide any budget surplus  between the districts.
The decision-making process in the legislature follows a simple sequential protocol. At stage
 =1 2of this process, a representative is randomly selected to make a proposal to the ﬂoor. A
proposal consist of policies (0) and district-speciﬁc transfers ()

=1 satisfying the constraints
that
X
  does not exceed the budget surplus (0 )a n d0 does not exceed the debt
limit . If the proposal receives the votes of representatives, then it is implemented and
the legislature adjourns until the following period. If the proposal does not pass, then the process
moves to stage  + 1, and a representative is selected again to make a new proposal.24
Following the analysis in Battaglini and Coate (2008), it can be shown that in cost state
 with initial debt level , the equilibrium policies {() () 0







(0 )+ +  + 0(0)





where  =  and 0(0) is equilibrium aggregate lifetime citizen expected utility in state 0
with debt level 0. The equilibrium value functions ()a n d()a r ed e ﬁned recursively by:
()=(() () 0
() )+ +  + 0(0
()) (19)
for  ∈ {}. Representatives’ value functions, which reﬂect only aggregate utility in their
respective districts, are given by () and ().
S i n c ei ti sn o tt h ef o c u so ft h i sw o r k ,w eo m i th e r et h ef o r m a lp r o o fo ft h i sc h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
of equilibrium.25 The underlying intuition, however, is easily described. In the legislative
bargaining process, the proposer chooses policies (0)a n dt r a n s f e r s( )

=1 to maximize the
expected welfare of his own district. The proposer may have to oﬀer transfers to other districts
to get his proposal approved. In this case, in a symmetric equilibrium, he oﬀers the same transfer










24 This process may either continue indeﬁnitely until a proposal is chosen, or may last for a ﬁnite number of
stages as in Battaglini and Coate (2008): the analysis is basically the same. In Battaglini and Coate (2008) it is
assumed that in the last stage, one representative is randomly picked to choose a policy; this representative is then
required to choose a policy that divides the budget surplus evenly between districts.
25 See Battaglini and Coate (2008) for a more extensive discussion.
18where 
+1
 () is equilibrium aggregate lifetime citizen expected utility in state  with initial debt
level  at the beginning of stage  +1 . T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that a representative would vote for
the proposal only if the associated utility, the left hand side of (20), is at least as high as the utility
of his outside option, 
+1
 ().26 In equilibrium, (20) must be satisﬁed with equality, implying
that, at the margin, transfers depend on 1
 [ +  + 0(0)]. This forces the proposer
to internalize the opportunity cost of the policies (0)f o raf r a c t i o n of the population.




[ +  + 0(0)] (21)
is equivalent to the objective function in (18) (just multiply through by  = ). The fact that
representatives’ value functions are described by (19) (divided by 1) then follows from the fact
that each representative is ex ante equally likely to be the proposer or, if not the proposer, to be
included in the coalition whose districts receive transfers.
A convenient short-hand way of understanding the equilibrium is to imagine that in each
period a minimum winning coalition (mwc) of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e si sr a n d o m l yc h o s e na n dt h a t
this coalition collectively chooses policies to maximize its aggregate utility. Problem (18) reﬂects
the coalition’s maximization problem and, because membership in this coalition is random, all
representatives are ex ante identical and have a common value function given by (19) (divided by
1). In what follows, we will use this way of understanding the equilibrium and speak as if a
randomly drawn mwc is choosing policy in each period.
For the purposes of the rest of this paper, we deﬁne a political equilibrium as consisting of
policy functions {() () 0
()} for each state  and value functions ()a n d()s u c h
that: (i) the policy functions solve (18) given the value functions, and, (ii) the value functions
satisfy (19) given the policy functions. An equilibrium is said to be well-behaved if the associated
value functions ()a n d() are concave for debt levels below . In the Appendix, we show:
Proposition 3 There exists a well-behaved equilibrium.
The equilibrium policies are characterized by solving problem (18). Again, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that the mwc will always set taxes suﬃciently high that the wage is .
Indeed, because 1, it must be the case that the wage is , for the mwc would always raise
26 The term 
+1
 () is endogenous in equilibrium, but from the point of view of the proposer it is given and
so irrelevant for his policy choice.















2 +  ln +(  − 1)(() − )+(0 − (1 + ))+0(0)
 (0) ≥ 0,  +
()






which is the equilibrium analog of (17). To understand the equilibrium policies we follow the
procedure used for the benevolent government case. First, we investigate the equilibrium tax and
public good levels for a given revenue requirement. Then we understand the revenue requirements
that arise in the long run by characterizing the equilibrium debt distribution.
4.1 The static problem















2 +  ln +(  − 1)(() − ) − 







The key diﬀerence between this and problem (12) is that, since 1, the mwc cares directly about
net tax revenues ()−. This makes the mwc’s indiﬀerence curves more convex than those
of the benevolent government, steeper at high tax rates and ﬂatter at low tax rates. Moreover,
rather than preferences being always increasing in  and decreasing in , there are interior optimal
levels of both  and . Thus, the mwc’s preferences exhibit an interior satiation point in ()
space. As  increases, this point converges to (120), the revenue maximizing policies.
Following the strategy used to study the static problem, ﬁrst consider what happens when
the revenue requirement is so low that the budget constraint is not binding. Let the optimal




)a n dl e t






.I ft h er e v e n u er e q u i r e m e n ti sl e s st h a n





)a n du s e
the surplus revenues 

− to ﬁnance transfers to their districts. There are two possibilities for the
optimal policies, depending on whether the mwc’s satiation point lies outside or inside the resource





correspond to the point of tangency between the indiﬀerence curve and the resource constraint.
This case is similar to the situation illustrated in Fig. 1.B, although the optimal policies diﬀer
and hence the output mix is distorted. The second possibility is illustrated in Fig. 3.B. In this
20Figure 3:




) are just equal to the mwc’s satiation point. Obviously, since
they lie inside the resource constraint, these policies involve unemployment.
As we show in the Appendix, the mwc’s satiation point lies outside the resource constraint if
and only if  is less than ∗
,w h e r e∗










Intuitively, higher values of  increase the mwc’s preference for net revenues. When  exceeds ∗
,
the mwc’s preferred tax rate is suﬃciently high and its preferred public good level suﬃciently low,
that unemployment arises.
If the revenue requirement exceeds 

 the mwc will not make transfers to their districts and
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This is equivalent to the problem studied in Section 3 and thus the solution will be as described
by Proposition 1.27 When  is less than ∗
, there will be two regions, one with full employment
27 The fact that  is multiplied by  in the objective function has no eﬀect on the optimal policies, since  is
21with a distorted output mix,  ≤ ∗
; and one with unemployment,  ∗
.T h e t h r e s h o l d ∗
 is
t h es a m ea st h et h r e s h o l di d e n t i ﬁed in Proposition 1. When  exceeds ∗
, there will be just one




Summarizing this discussion, we have the following analogy to Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 There exists a revenue requirement ∗
  
 such that the solution to problem (23)
has the following properties.
• If  ≤ 





).W h e n ∗
, these policies involve full employ-
ment with a distorted output mix. When  ∗
, these policies involve unemployment.













 ()),a n d ,i f
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 ()). This case only arises when  ∗
,s i n c e

  ∗





}, the optimal policies are (b ()b ()) and involve unemployment. In this
range, as  increases, unemployment increases.
4.2 Dynamics
As for the benevolent government case, deﬁne ()=( 1 + )−0
() to be the revenue requirement
implied by the equilibrium policies in state  with initial debt level . Letting (
()
()) denote
the static equilibrium policies described in Proposition 4, it is clear that (() ()) will equal
(
(())
(())). As in the previous section, therefore, the key issue is to identify which of
the cases described in Proposition 4 will arise in the long run. This requires understanding the
long run behavior of debt.
Given the equilibrium policy functions, for any initial debt level ,w ec a nd e ﬁne (0)t o
be the probability that next period’s debt level will be less than 0. Given a distribution −1()
of debt at time  − 1, the distribution at time  is (0)=
R
 (0)−1() A distribution
∗(0)i ss a i dt ob ea ninvariant distribution if ∗(0)=
R
 (0)∗(). If it exists, the invariant
distribution describes the steady state of the government’s debt distribution. We now have:
Proposition 5 With political decision-making, there exists a debt level  ∈ (
) such that
the equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique, non-degenerate, invariant distribution with
just a constant.
22full support on [). The dynamic pattern of debt is counter-cyclical: the government expands
debt when private sector costs are high and contracts debt when costs are low until it reaches the
ﬂoor level .
The logic underlying the counter-cyclical behavior of debt is straightforward. As explained
earlier, in this economy, debt allows government to transfer revenues from good times to bad
times which permits the smoothing of distortions. With a benevolent government, debt does not
play this role in the long run because the government accumulates suﬃcient assets to completely
eliminate distortions. With political decision-making, the ﬂoor debt level  d e s c r i b e di nt h e
proposition limits government asset accumulation. Intuitively, once the debt level has reached ,
the mwc prefers to divert surplus revenues in good times to transfers rather than to paying down
more debt. As a result, the need to smooth distortions remains in the long run and debt exhibits
a counter-cyclical pattern. This ﬁnding is analogous to the results of Battaglini and Coate (2008)
and Barshegyan, Battaglini, and Coate (2010) for the tax smoothing model. The debt level 
depends on the fundamentals of the economy and can be characterized following the approach
in Battaglini and Coate (2008), but these details are not central to our mission here and so we
relegate them to the Appendix. For now, we will simply assume that  is positive, which seems
the empirically relevant case.
Higher debt levels translate into higher revenue requirements for the government. Thus,
Proposition 5 implies that the range of revenue requirements arising in equilibrium in state 
are [() ()]. By comparing these ranges with the thresholds in Proposition 4, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 6 With political decision-making, the following is true in the long run.
• If  ∗
, there is always unemployment in both states. Unemployment is weakly increasing
in the economy’s debt level, strictly so in the high cost state and in the low cost state for
suﬃciently high debt levels.
• If  ∈ (∗
∗
), there is always unemployment in the high cost state. In the low cost state,
there is full employment with a distorted output mix for low debt levels and unemployment
for high debt levels. Unemployment is weakly increasing in the economy’s debt level, strictly
so in the high cost state and in the low cost state for suﬃciently high debt levels.
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, in the high cost state, there is full employment with a distorted output mix
for low debt levels and unemployment for high debt levels. In the low cost state, there is
full employment with a distorted output mix for low debt levels and either full employment
with a distorted output mix or unemployment for high debt levels. Unemployment is weakly
increasing in the economy’s debt level, strictly so in the high cost state for suﬃciently high
debt levels.
To understand the result, recall from Proposition 4 that when  is less than ∗
,t h e r ew i l l
be full employment with a distorted output mix if the revenue requirement is less than ∗
 and
unemployment if  exceeds ∗
. This unemployment will be increasing in the revenue requirement.
When  exceeds ∗
, there will always be unemployment. This unemployment will be constant in
the revenue requirement when  is less than 

 and increasing when  exceeds 

. Now note that,
for the high cost state, it can be shown that () exceeds 

 and that () exceeds ∗
.T h e
latter implies that when  is less than ∗
, there will be unemployment in the high cost state for
suﬃciently large debt levels. The former implies that when  exceeds ∗
, unemployment will be
increasing in . For the low cost state, it can be shown that ()i sl e s st h a n

. Depending on
the parameters, () may or may not exceed ∗
. These facts imply that when  is less than ∗
,
there will be full employment in the low cost state for low debt levels and there may or may not
be unemployment for suﬃciently large debt levels. When  exceeds ∗
, unemployment in the low
cost state will be constant in  for low debt levels and increasing for suﬃciently high debt levels.
Pulling all this information together, yields Proposition 6.
To illustrate the workings of the model, consider the case in which  is between ∗
 and ∗
.
In this case, there is always unemployment in high cost states but full employment in low cost
states for suitably low debt levels. The government mitigates unemployment in high cost states
by issuing debt. If the economy’s debt level is low enough, then a return to the low cost state will
be suﬃcient to restore full employment. If the economy is in the high cost state for a suﬃciently
long period of time, however, debt will get suﬃciently high that unemployment will persist even
when the low cost state returns. When the low cost state returns, the legislators reduce debt. If
the low cost state persists, debt will fall below the level at which full employment is achieved.
Debt will eventually fall to the ﬂoor level , at which point the mwc will divert surplus revenues
to transfers rather than debt reduction.
244.3 The equilibrium policy mix
Having established the basic patterns of ﬁscal policy and unemployment arising in equilibrium,
we now oﬀer some observations on the policy mix the government chooses. We ﬁrst discuss the
case in which there is full employment and then turn to unemployment.
Full employment Proposition 6 tells us that when there is full employment, the output mix
will always be distorted. This means that either the public sector is too large or too small. The
direction of the distortion turns out to depend on the underlying parameters of the economy in a
relatively simple way. Recall that full employment arises in state  when  is less than ∗
 and the
revenue requirement is less than ∗
. There are two possibilities: the revenue requirement can be
above or below 

.I nt h eﬁrst possibility, there are no surplus revenues; in the second, the mwc
is making transfers to their districts. The second possibility can only arise in the low cost state
since equilibrium revenue requirements in the high cost state are larger than 

.W ed i s c u s se a c h
possibility in turn.
No suplus revenues When the revenue requirement exceeds 

, we know from Propositions
1 and 4 that the output mix is distorted towards public production when 
 is less than 
−
 ()
and towards the private good otherwise. In the Appendix, we show that 








This condition is more likely to hold the smaller is the number of entrepreneurs  and the larger
is the economy’s preference for public goods . To gain intuition, recall that with respect to the
ﬁrst best policies, the policies in this range of revenue requirements maintain full employment
but are biased in the direction of raising revenue. The government is therefore seeking changes
in tax rates and public production that keep employment constant but generate more revenue.
Keeping employment constant requires that if taxes are raised, any private sector workers laid
oﬀ are employed in the public sector. Conversely, if public production is reduced, entrepreneurs
must be incentivized to hire the displaced public sector workers. Clearly, if entrepreneurs can be
induced to hire more workers for only a very small tax cut, then it makes sense to reduce public
production. The savings from reducing public production will exceed the loss in tax revenues.
The employment response for any given tax cut will be greater, the higher are the ﬁrst best taxes.
Accordingly, when ﬁrst best taxes are high, reducing public production will be the optimal way
25to distort the output mix. First best taxes will be high when the ﬁrst best public good level is
high (high )a n dw h e nt h es i z eo ft h ep r i v a t es e c t o ri sl a r g e( h i g h).
Transfers When the revenue requirement is less than 






and uses the surplus revenues 

− to ﬁnance transfers. The equilibrium policies correspond to the
point of tangency between the indiﬀerence curve and the resource constraint as illustrated in Fig.




) when condition (26) is satisﬁed and towards the private good otherwise. To understand
this, note that relative to a benevolent government, the mwc is putting more weight on raising
revenue for transfers but is still choosing to preserve full employment. It is therefore choosing tax
rates and public production that keep employment constant but generate more revenue. The logic
discussed above therefore applies.28
Unemployment When there is unemployment, condition (26) also turns out to play a role in
determining how the equilibrium policies compare with those that minimize unemployment. The
unemployment minimizing policies when the revenue requirement is  involve the tax rate ∗
 at
w h i c ht h es l o p eo ft h eb u d g e tl i n ei se q u a lt ot h es l o pe of the full employment line with associated
public good level ∗
() given by (15) (see Fig. 1.D).29 In general, the equilibrium policies will
not minimize unemployment. They could involve a lower or higher tax rate depending upon the
parameters of the economy and the size of the revenue requirement. When they involve a lower
tax rate, increasing the size of government would create jobs but legislators hold back because
the lost private output is more valuable than the additional public output. When they involve a
higher tax rate, reducing the size of government would create jobs but legislators hold back for
the opposite reason. If condition (26) is not satisﬁed, the equilibrium tax rate is greater than
∗
.30 If condition (26) is satisﬁed, matters depend on the revenue requirement. For suﬃciently
high revenue requirements, the equilibrium tax rate in the high cost state must again be greater






























29 In the Appendix, we show that ∗






is non-negative. If this is not the case, the unemployment minimizing tax rate is such that ()= and the
associated public good level is 0
30 To see this, observe that since there is unemployment, the revenue requirement  must exceed ∗
 and hence
 ()m u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a n (∗
). But if condition (26) is not satisﬁed, then  (∗
)m u s te q u a l+
 (∗





. This is because as  approaches (), the equilibrium tax rate approaches the revenue
maximizing level 12, which exceeds ∗
. However, in the low cost state or in the high cost state
for suﬃciently low revenue requirements, the equilibrium tax rate can be less than ∗
.
4.4 Equilibrium stimulus plans
In the steady state of the political equilibrium, when private sector costs are high, the government
expands debt and the funds are used to mitigate unemployment.31 The government therefore
employs ﬁscal stimulus plans, as conventionally deﬁned. By studying the size of these stimulus
plans and the changes in policy they ﬁnance, we can obtain a positive theory of ﬁscal stimulus.
More speciﬁcally, in the high cost state, we can interpret  − () as the magnitude of the
stimulus, since this measures the amount of additional resources obtained by the government
to ﬁnance ﬁscal policy changes (i.e., the debt increase 0
() − ). An understanding of how the
stimulus funds are used can be obtained by comparing the equilibrium tax and public good policies
with the policies that would be optimal if the debt level were held constant.
The simplest case to consider is when the stimulus package does not completely eliminate
unemployment. From Proposition 6, this must be the case when  exceeds ∗
. Moreover, even
when this is not the case, unemployment will remain post-stimulus whenever the economy’s debt
31 Even when  is less than ∗
 and the economy’s debt is low, Assumption 1 implies that there will be unem-
ployment prior to government stimulus if the ﬂoor debt level  is positive.
27level is suﬃciently high (i.e., ()  ∗
). Drawing on the analysis in Section 3, Figure 4
illustrates what happens in this case. From Proposition 4, the policies that would be chosen if
the debt level were held constant are (b ()b ()). The reduction in the revenue requirement
made possible by the stimulus funds, shifts the budget line up and permits a new policy choice
(b (())b (())). As discussed in Section 3, in the unemployment range, the tax rate is
increasing in the revenue requirement and public production is decreasing. Thus, we know that
b (()) is less than b ()a n dt h a tb (()) exceeds b (), implying that stimulus funds
will be used for both tax cuts and increases in public production.32
In terms of the eﬀectiveness of equilibrium stimulus plans, we know from the previous sub-
section that if b (()) is less than ∗
 (the tax rate at which the slope of the budget line equals
that of the resource constraint) then reducing the tax cut slightly and using the revenues to ﬁnance
a slightly larger public production increase will produce a bigger reduction in unemployment.
Conversely, if b (()) exceeds ∗
 then reducing the public production increase and using the
revenues to ﬁnance a slightly larger tax cut will produce a bigger reduction in unemployment. As
discussed in the previous sub-section, both situations are possible depending on the parameters
and the economy’s debt level.
One way of thinking about these results concerning the comparison of b (()) and ∗
 is
in terms of multipliers. It is commonplace in the empirical literature to try to evaluate the
multipliers associated with diﬀerent stimulus measures.33 The multiplier associated with a
particular stimulus measure is deﬁned to be the change in GDP divided by the budgetary cost of
the measure. In our model, measuring GDP is more problematic than in the typical macroeconomic
model because output is produced by both the private and public sectors, and there is no obvious
way to value public sector output. Perhaps the simplest approach is to deﬁne GDP as equalling
32 It should be stressed that the purpose of the tax cuts is to incentivize the private sector to hire more workers.
This is logically distinct from the idea that tax cuts return purchasing power to citizens and stimulate demand,
thereby creating jobs. Both types of arguments for tax cuts arise in the policy debate and it is important to keep
them distinct. Similarly, the purpose of the increase in government spending is to hire more public sector workers,
not to increase transfers to citizens. Notice that while the model allows the government to use stimulus funds to
increase transfers, it chooses not to do so. Such transfers would have no aggregate stimulative eﬀect because they
must be paid for by future taxation. Taylor (2011) argues that the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
largely consisted of increases in transfers. Moreover, he argues that these transfer increases had little impact on
household consumption since they were saved.
33 Papers trying to measure the multiplier impacts of diﬀerent policies include Alesina and Ardagna (2010),
Barro and Redlick (2011), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2011a), Romer and
Romer (2010), Serrato and Wingender (2011), and Shoag (2010). A central issue in this literature is the relative
size of tax cut and public spending multipliers. For overviews and discussion of the literature see Auerbach, Gale,
and Harris (2010), Parker (2011), and Ramey (2011b).
28private sector output plus the cost of public production. With this deﬁnition, when there is
unemployment, the public production multiplier is 1 and the tax cut multiplier is approximately
(1 − 2b (()))( − ).34 The tax cut multiplier will exceed the public production
multiplier if b (()) exceeds ∗
 and be less than the public production multiplier if b (())
is less than ∗
. The analysis illustrates why we should not expect the government to choose policies
in such a way as to equate multipliers across instruments.35 Tax cuts and public production
increases have diﬀerent implications for the mix of public and private outputs. A further important
point to note is that the tax multiplier is highly non-linear.36 T a xc u t sw i l lb em o r ee ﬀective the
larger is the tax rate and the tax rate will be higher the larger the economy’s initial debt level.
When the stimulus package eliminates unemployment, as would be the case when  exceeds
∗
 and the economy’s debt level is low (()  ∗
), matters are more complicated. This is
because of the non-monotonic behavior of policies in the second case identiﬁed in Proposition
1. In particular, we will not necessarily get both tax cuts and an increase in public production.
Fig. 5.A illustrates a case in which the stimulus package involves not only using all the stimulus
funds to fund tax cuts but also reducing public production to supplement the stimulus funds. Fig.
5.B illustrates a case in which the stimulus package involves increases in both taxes and public
production. The model is therefore consistent with a variety of possible stimulus plans.
It is interesting to understand how the magnitude of the stimulus as measured by  − ()
depends on the initial debt level .N o t eﬁr s tt h a ta s approaches its maximum level ,t h es i z eo f
the stimulus must converge to zero. Interpreting the distance  −  as the economy’s ﬁscal space,
this result is simply saying that when the economy’s ﬁscal space becomes very small (as a result,
s a y ,o fas e q u e n c eo fn e g a t i v es h o c k so r weak political institutions), its eﬀorts to ﬁght further
negative shocks with ﬁscal policy will necessarily be limited.37 It is tempting to conclude more
generally, that the size of the stimulus as measured by −() should depend negatively on the
initial debt level . While we conjecture that this will typically be the case, it is not something
34 This deﬁnition of GDP becomes more problematic when there is full employment and the minimum wage
constraint is not binding. This is because  and  impact the wage and hence the costs of public production.
Perhaps the key point to note concerning multipliers when the minimum wage constraint is not binding, is that
the level of employment is independent of  and .
35 This point is also made by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2011).
36 T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fn o n - l i n e a r i t i e sa n dt h ed i ﬃculties this creates for measurement is a theme of Parker (2011).
37 For more on the concept of ﬁscal space and an attempt to measure it see Ostroy, Ghosh, Kim and Qureshi
(2010).
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that we have been able to show analytically. It should also be noted that even if this were the
case, the eﬀectiveness of stimulus plans will not necessarily be decreasing in the economy’s ﬁscal
space. This is because as the economy’s ﬁscal space contracts, taxes on the private sector increase
to ﬁnance debt repayment. When taxes are high, the tax multiplier is high, meaning that small
tax cuts can create large gains in employment.
4.5 Empirical implications
The model has two unambiguous qualitative implications. The ﬁrst is that debt and unemployment
levels should be positively correlated. This follows from Proposition 6. Since we are not aware of
any other theoretical work that links debt and unemployment, we believe this is a novel prediction.
While we not aware of any empirical work that looks at this issue, it is certainly something that
could be tested.
The second implication is that the dynamic pattern of debt is counter-cyclical. More precisely,
increases in debt should be positively correlated with reductions in output and visa versa. This
follows from Proposition 5. This implication also emerges from tax smoothing models and simple
Keynesian theories of ﬁscal policy, so there is nothing particularly distinctive about it. Empirical
support for this prediction for the U.S. comes from the work of Barro (1986).
















Fig. 6.A Fig. 6.B
Figure 6:
Depending on the parameters, when the economy experiences a high cost shock, public spending
could increase or decrease, and tax rates could increase or decrease. To illustrate, consider a
situation in which there is unemployment pre and post-shock. Two eﬀects are at work. First,
when  decreases the mwc’s indiﬀerence curve becomes ﬂatter, so if the budget line did not
change,  and  would increase (this is represented by the move from point 1 to point 2 in
Fig. 6). Intuitively, the marginal cost of raising taxes is lower because the private sector is
less productive and therefore taxation results in a lower output response. It therefore becomes
optimal to increase the size of the public sector. Th er e d u c t i o ni np r i v a t es e c t o rp r o d u c t i v i t y ,
however, does impact the budget line. Speciﬁcally, it both shifts downward and becomes ﬂatter.
Intuitively, any given tax raises less revenue and any given increase in taxes results in a smaller
revenue increase. Although the downward shift is partially compensated by an increase in debt,
the combination of the downward shift and the ﬂattening makes the net eﬀect on taxes and public
spending ambiguous. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. When the economy experiences a high cost
shock, taxes and public spending move from point 1 to point 3. In Fig. 6.A, public spending and
taxes decrease and in Fig. 6.B, public spending and taxes increase. Matters are only made more
38 There is an extensive literature on the cyclical behavior of public spending and taxes. See, for example,
Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008), Barro (1986), Barshegyan, Battaglini, and Coate (2010), Furceri and
Karras (2011), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Lane (2003), and Talvi and Vegh (2005). In light of the variety of empirical
correlations found in the literature, the fact that the model predicts no clear pattern of behavior is perhaps a virtue.
31complicated if there is full employment pre-shock.
In terms of political variables, the logic of the model certainly suggests that weaker political
institutions (as proxied by higher ) should be positively correlated with high average levels of
debt and unemployment. However, actually proving this comparative static result is diﬃcult to do
analytically. Exploring this therefore requires computing a calibrated version of the equilibrium
of the model, which is a task we leave for future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple dynamic model in which to explore the interaction between ﬁscal
policy and unemployment. Two distinct scenarios have been considered, one in which policies are
chosen by a benevolent government and the other with political decision-making. The benevolent
government solution provides an interesting normative benchmark, but has clearly counter-factual
predictions. The equilibrium with political decision-making oﬀers a more appealing account of
the behavior of ﬁscal policy and unemployment.
With political decision-making, unemployment will arise when the private sector experiences
negative shocks. To mitigate this unemployment, the government will employ debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
stimulus plans, which will generally involve both tax cuts and public production increases. In
normal times, the government will contract debt until it reaches a ﬂoor level. Depending on
the extent of political frictions, unemployment can arise even in normal times. At all times,
unemployment levels are increasing in the economy’s debt level. When there is full employment,
the mix of public and private output is distorted. The direction of distortion in terms of whether
the size of government is too large or too small, depends upon the underlying parameters of the
economy.
There are many diﬀerent directions in which the ideas presented here might usefully be de-
veloped. In terms of the basic model, it would be desirable to incorporate a richer model of
unemployment into the analysis. The search theoretic approach of Michaillat (2011) would seem
promising in this regard since it allows for both rationing unemployment (as in this paper) and
frictional unemployment. This would permit us to move beyond the sharp distinction between
full employment and unemployment, which would be helpful for developing empirical predictions.
With respect to political decision-making, it would be interesting to introduce class conﬂict into
the analysis. The current model limits the conﬂict among citizens to disagreements concerning the
32allocation of transfers between districts. This is made possible by assuming that each legislator
behaves so as to maximize the aggregate utility of the citizens in his district. Alternatively, we
could assume that legislators either represent workers or entrepreneurs in their districts. This
would introduce an additional conﬂict over policies in the sense that workers prefer policies that
keep wages and employment high, while entrepreneurs prefer policies which keep proﬁts high. Such
class conﬂict may have important implications for the choice of ﬁscal policy. Finally, on the em-
pirical front, it would be interesting to explore the model’s predictions concerning the relationship
between unemployment and debt.
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366A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1












+  ln −  + (() −  − )+
µ





Thus,  is the multiplier on the budget constraint and  is the multiplier on the resource constraint.
Using the expressions for ()a n d() in (8) and (9), the ﬁrst order conditions with respect
to  and  are


=  +  (27)
and
(1 − 2)( − )= +( 1− ) −  (28)
There are three cases to consider.
Case 1. Assume ﬁrst that the budget constraint is not binding, so that  = 0. In this case (27)
implies that  =

  0 and hence there is no unemployment. Substituting this expression for 
into (28), we obtain





















,w en e e dt h a t ≤ 
 for the budget constraint not to be
binding.
Case 2. Assume next that both the budget constraint and the resource constraints are binding,
so that 0a n d0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,w eh a v et h a t














Assuming that (34) has a solution, it will have two solutions 
−
 ()a n d
+
 (), which correspond
to the points illustrated in Fig. 1.C. The associated public good levels, 
−
 ()a n d
+
 (), are then
obtained from (33).
















provide a higher value of the objective function. In order for (34) to have a solution, the budget line
must lie above the resource constraint for some range of taxes. Let ∗
 denote the tax rate at which
the slope of the budget line is equal to the slope of the full employment line and let ∗
()d e n o t e
the level of public good that satisﬁes the budget constraint (32) given this tax rate. Now deﬁne
∗∗
 to be that revenue requirement at which the point (∗
∗
()) is tangent to the full employment
line. Then, (34) has a solution if and only if  ≤ ∗∗
























provide a higher value of the
objective function, assume that  ∈ (
∗∗
 ). There are two possibilities: i) 
 
−
 ()i nw h i c h
case the ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c y( 









, and ii) 
 
+
 ()i nw h i c h
case the ﬁrst best policy (









. Since the objective function is

















. In case i), taxes and public goods are increasing in  and in case ii) taxes and
public goods are decreasing in . We conclude that a necessary condition to be in Case 2 is that
 ∈ (
 ∗∗























 (). We will return to provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition to be in Case 2 after
analyzing Case 3.
Case 3. Finally, assume that only the budget constraint binds, so that 0a n d =0 .
Substituting (27) into (28), we obtain
 =
(1 − 2)( − )
(( − )+)
 (35)
Substituting (35) into the budget constraint (32), we obtain:
(1 − )( − )2 −
µ




This equation has a unique solution b () in the relevant range for , i.e. [012]. Since the right
hand side of (36) is always increasing for  less than 12, b ()i si n c r e a s i n gi n. The associated
38value of , b (), is obtained from (35). Since the right hand side of (35), is decreasing in , b ()
is decreasing in . Furthermore, note that unemployment is an increasing function of  and a
decreasing function of ,s oi ti si n c r e a s i n gi n as well. Now deﬁne the revenue requirement ∗
 to
be such that the resource constraint is satisﬁed with equality at the policies (b ()b ()); that is,
which satisﬁes
b (∗
)= − (1 − b (∗
))( − ) (37)





, then it must be the case that the resource constraint binds while if  ∗
,t h e n
the resource constraint does not bind. Thus, as claimed in the Proposition, we are in Case 2 if
 ∈ (
 ∗
]a n dC a s e3i f ∗
. ¥
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the Envelope Theorem and the ﬁrst order condition for 0, it is straightforward to show that
for each cost state  and any initial debt level ,t h eo p t i m a ll e v e lo fb o r r o w i n g0
()i ss u c ht h a t :
1+() − ()=1+ [0(0
())] (38)
where ()a n d() are, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers of the budget constraint and of
the upperbound on debt in (17). We now proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst prove that for each cost state  and any initial debt level  such that  there
is an ()  0 such that 0
()   − (). Consider the optimal policy {() () 0
()}
with associated Lagrange multipliers (), (), and (), where () is the multiplier on
t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti n( 17). As noted in the text, if (
()
()) denote the optimal static




() is the revenue requirement implied by the optimal borrowing level.
Assume, by contradiction, that 0
() is arbitrarily close to ;t h a ti s ,0
()= − ,w h e r e is
arbitrarily small. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1.1. Assume that ()  0a n d()  0. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a t( 2 6 )i ss a t i s ﬁed. In this


















 (())( − ) − 
(39)
39Consider now 0(−), for 0 ∈ {}.A s → 0, we must have (−) → 12a n d(−) →
0. By Assumption 1, this implies that (−)=0f o r suﬃciently small.39 We therefore have
from (28) that
( − )=
( − ) +( 1− ( − ))
(1 − 2( − ))( − )





becomes arbitrarily large. Since lim→0 ()  , on the contrary,
condition (39) shows that () is bounded as  → 0.40 This generates a contradiction since
by (38) we must have () ≥  [0(0
())]. The case in which (26) is not satisﬁed is completely
analogous.
Case 1.2. Assume that ()  0a n d() = 0. In this case, from Proposition 1, taxes and
public goods are given by (b (())b (())). We can write ()= (()) where ()i sa




It follows that if 0
()= − , we can express all the policy choices as a function of .T h u s ,
setting 0
()= − ,w eh a v e()= ()w h e r e () solves (40) and ()= ( ()) = ().
Note that as  → 0, we have  () → e 12. For if  () → 12, then () → 0 and (40) would
not be satisﬁed since .M o r e o v e r ,  () → e  implies () → e 0. From (28) and (38), we
have that:
()=
() +( 1− ())







( − ) +( 1− ( − ))
(1 − 2( − ))( − )
¸
 (41)
where the last equality follows from the fact that, as in Case 1.1, we must have ( − ) → 12
and ( − ) → 0a s → 0: and this implies that ( − )=0f o r suﬃciently small. As in
Case 1.1, the right hand side of (41) diverges to inﬁnity, while the left hand side converges to a
ﬁnite value: so we again have a contradiction.
Case 1.3. Assume () = 0. In this case (38) implies that ()=0a n d()  0 as well. This
implies that taxes and public goods are given by (

). The ﬁrst order condition with respect
39 This follows from the fact that Assumption 1 implies   ( − )2.
40 If () →∞as  → 0, then  w o u l dh a v et oc o n v e r g et o1 / 2a n d to 0: but then neither the resource
constraint, nor the budget constraint would be binding, a contradiction.




, which is impossible since by an argument similar to the argument of
the previous two cases, the right hand side becomes arbitrarily large as  → 0.
Step 2. Step 1 implies that 0
()   and that () = 0 for any . From (38) we
therefore conclude that the Lagrange multiplier () is a non-negative martingale. Deﬁning
the sequences h  0




−1)e x i s t s
¢
=1 . D e ﬁne  = 
 to be the level of assets that in steady state
generate interest earnings just suﬃcient to cover the discrepancy between 
 and (
).
When  ≤ , by holding asset levels constant the government can achieve full employment and the
optimal output mix in both the high and low cost state in the current and all future periods. So
() = 0 for any  if and only if  ≤ . Assume by contradiction that Pr(lim→∞   
)  0. In
this case, there must be an 0, and a set of sequences hi with positive probability such that, for




with ()  
 + for any arbitrarily
large (). Note that   
+ implies that (0





()−1) for some positive : this contradicts the fact
that ()(0
()−1) converges with probability one. We conclude that Pr(lim→∞  ≤ 
)=1 .
The result now follows from Proposition 1. ¥
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We will demonstrate the existence of a pair of concave value functions ()a n d()t h a ts a t i s f y
(19) given the policy functions they generate via (18). Note ﬁrst that in political equilibrium, the
minimum winning coalition will always choose a higher debt level than  ≡ 
. If the debt
level were below , the mwc could marginally increase debt, use the proceeds to ﬁnance transfers,
and increase its current period payoﬀ by  (see (18)). The cost of such an action would be going
into the next period with a marginally higher debt level. But the only eﬀect of this would be
to reduce the transfers received by next period’s mwc (see Propositions 4 and 5 below). Since
members of the current mwc will not necessarily belong to next period’s mwc, the discounted
expected reduction in future transfer payoﬀsi s1 Thus, increasing debt is optimal.
Given this observation, we look for a pair of equilibrium value functions in the compact space




.L e t be the metric space of




endowed with the sup
norm, kk =s u p ∈[] ||.L e t2 be the Cartesian product of two such spaces endowed with the
41maximum norm,







, for any 2 ∈ 2.
As noted in the paragraph following the statement of Proposition 3, the policies in a political















2 +  ln +(  − 1)(0)+0(0)
 (0) ≥ 0,  +
()













denote the feasible policy space, where  is some suﬃciently large upper bound on public goods
and  is some suﬃciently low lower bound on taxes. Note that we can impose an upper bound
on public good levels without loss of generality since in every period revenues are bounded by
max ()+; similarly there is no loss of generality in assuming that the tax rate is bounded
below since it would never be optimal nor feasible to provide unbounded subsidies to the entre-
preneurs. Deﬁne a policy function to be a function () which associates a policy with any given
initial debt level  and cost state .L e t(; ) ⊆  be the set of optimal policies for (42) when
the initial debt level is ,t h es t a t ei s, and the value functions are  =(  ). Let ( )b e
the set of optimal policy functions for the problem with value functions  ;t h a ti s ,() ∈ ( )





Now, for any  ∈ 2,d e ﬁne ∗
 ( ) ⊂ ( ) to be the subset of optimal policy functions
which are (i) continuous in , and, (ii) which generate a net of transfer budget surplus function
(() () 0
())t h a ti sw e a k l yc o n v e xi n. Observe that, when viewed as a function of
 , ∗
 ( ) is a correspondence from 2 into the set of policy functions.
Lemma A.1. For each state , the correspondence ∗
 ( ) is non empty, compact, and convex
valued.
Proof. Available from the authors on request. ¥
For a given  ∈ 2 and cost state ,l e tΥ( )b ed e ﬁned by:
Υ( )=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
e  ()
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∃ () ∈ ∗


















 (()() 0()) = ()
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭






Lemma A.2. For each cost state , Υ( ) is a non empty, convex, and compact valued corre-
spondence from 2 into  w i t hac l o s e dg r a p h .
Proof. Available from the authors on request. ¥
Deﬁne the correspondence from 2 into 2:
( )=
n
(e () e ())




Lemma A.3. The correspondence ( ) has a ﬁxed point  ∗ = ( ∗).
Proof. It can be veriﬁed that Lemma A.2 implies that ( ) is a non empty, compact, and
convex-valued correspondence form 2 to 2 with a closed graph. The result therefore follows
from the Glicksberg-Fan Theorem (see Theorem 9.2.2 in Smart (1974)). ¥
Let (() ()) be a ﬁxed point of the correspondence ( ). Then ()a n d()a r e
concave functions that by construction satisfy (19) given the policy functions they generate via
(18). Proposition 3 is therefore established. ¥
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Given the discussion in the text, it suﬃces to show that the solution to Problem (23) when the




), is given by the tangency between the
indiﬀerence curve and resource constraint when  ∗
 and by the satiation point when  ∗
.












+ ln+(−1)(() −  − )−+
µ





where  is the multiplier on the resource constraint. Using the expressions for ()a n d()
in (8) and (9), the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to  and  respectively are


=(  − 1) +  (43)
and
( − 1)(1 − 2)( − )= +( 1− ) −  (44)







( − 1) − 



























Note that the left hand side of (46) is decreasing in ,s oi ti ss a t i s ﬁed if and only if  ∗
,w h e r e
∗
 is deﬁned by (24).




) when the resource constraint is binding. In this case,
(43) implies that  =

 − ( − 1)  0. Substituting this expression for  into (44), we obtain
 +( 1− ) =


+(  − 1)[(1 − 2)( − ) − ] (47)














( − (2 − 1))






6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is broken into three parts. In Section 7.5.1 we characterize  - the lower bound of the
equilibrium debt distribution. In Section 7.5.2 we prove that debt behaves in a counter-cyclical






6.5.1 The lowerbound 
Consider problem (22). When the budget constraint is not binding, the mwc will choose a debt
level from the set41
X( ) = arg max
0∈[]
{0 + 0(0)}
We will show that X( )c o n s i s t so fj u s tas i n g l ep o i n t .W eﬁrst need:






Proof. Available from the authors on request. ¥
We can now show that:
Lemma A.5. In any equilibrium, the set X( ) is a singleton.
Proof. Available from the authors on request. ¥
Given Lemma A.5, we deﬁne  to be the unique element of the set X( ). We also deﬁne 

 to










)e q u a l









Then, if the debt level  is such that  ≤ 





 )a n d






)t oﬁnance transfers. If 

 the budget
constraint binds so that no transfers are given. Tax revenues net of public good costs strictly
exceed 
















2 +  ln + 0(0)
 (0) ≥ 0,  +
()










Further information on the debt level  c a nb eo b t a i n e db yu s i n gaﬁrst order condition to
characterize it. However, before we can do this, we must ﬁrst establish that the value function is
diﬀerentiable. We have:
Lemma A.6. (i) If  ∗


















(ii) If  ∗
, there exists a unique debt level ∗∗
 ∈ (

] such that the resource constraint is
binding if and only if  ≤ ∗∗







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩













(1−2())(−)  ≥ ∗∗

⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭

Proof. (i) Suppose ﬁrst that  ∗
. From the discussion presented above, we know that if the
debt level  is such that  ≤ 





 ), and, if 

, the budget
constraint (0) ≥ 0 will be binding and the policies solve (50). Moreover, we know
from Proposition 5 that the resource constraint will not be binding. Consider some debt level .
Assume ﬁrst that  

. Then, we know from (19) that in a neighborhood of  it must be the
case that


















Thus, it is immediate that the value function ()i sd i ﬀerentiable at  and that
 0
()=−(1 + )=−1
Assume now that  

. Consider the function























Since the equilibrium policies are such that the budget constraint binds and the resource con-
straint does not bind, it follows that ()=
 ()a n d() ≥ 
 () for all  in a neighbor-
hood of . By the Envelope Theorem, the function  ()i sd i ﬀerentiable in  and its deriv-
ative is equal to −(1 + )[1+
 ()], where 
 () is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
(0
()) = 0 in (51) at .I t i s a l s o t h e c a s e t h a t 
 () is concave. To see this note
that we may write:























The objective function in (52) is concave in ,  and , and the constraint set is convex in ,
 and : so by a standard argument  () is concave. It now follows from Theorem 4.10 of
46Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) that ()i sd i ﬀerentiable at  with derivative  0
()=
0
 ()=−(1 + )[1+
 ()] = −[1 + 
 ()]. To complete the proof, consider the ﬁrst









 ())( − )=
 () +( 1− 
 ()) (54)
The second condition implies

 ()=
 () +( 1−  ())
(1 − 2 ())( − )
where we are using the fact that the solution of (51) at ,( 
 ()
 ()), must equal the
equilibrium policies ( ()  ()). We conclude that
− 0
()=1+
 () +( 1−  ())
(1 − 2 ())( − )
 (55)
(ii) Suppose now that  ∗
. Then we know from Proposition 4 that the resource constraint
is binding for  ≤ 
















2 +  ln +(  − 1)(0)+(0)






This is the mwc’s problem but ignoring the resource constraint. Let (e ()e ()) denote the
optimal tax and public good levels for this problem. It is easy to show that e () is non-decreasing
and e () is non-increasing in , implying that e ()+
( ())
 is non-increasing in .F r o m






  .I fe ()+
( ())
  ,d e ﬁne ∗∗
 to be
the minimal level of  such that e ()+
( ())
 ≤ .O t h e r w i s el e t∗∗
 = . Then the resource
constraint in the mwc’s problem is binding if and only if  ≤ ∗∗
 .
T u r n i n gt od i ﬀerentiability, consider some debt level .I f 

 or   ∗∗
 , the argument
follows exactly that in part (i). Suppose that  ∈ (

 ∗∗
 ). It follows that both the budget and
resource constraints are binding in a neighborhood of . Consider the function


























 ()a n d() ≥ 
 () for all  in a neighborhood of . The function  ()i s
diﬀerentiable in  and its derivative is equal to −(1 + )[1+
 ()], where 
 () is the Lagrangian
multiplier of the constraint (0
()) = 0 in (57) at . By a similar argument to that
just used,  () is concave. It again follows from Theorem 4.10 of Stokey, Lucas and Prescott
(1989) that ()i sd i ﬀerentiable at  with derivative  0
()=0
 ()=−(1 + )[1+
 ()] =
−[1 + 










 ())( − )=
 () +( 1− 
 ()) − 
 () (59)
where 
 () is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint. Solving the system, we have:
 ()=
 () +( 1−  ()) −

()
(1 − 2 ())( − ) − 
where we are using the fact that the solution of (57) at ,( 
 ()
 ()) equals the equilibrium
policies ( ()  ()). We therefore conclude that:
− 0
()=1+
 () +( 1−  ()) −

()
(1 − 2 ())( − ) − 
 (60)
Finally, suppose that  = ∗∗
 . It is easy to see that in a neighborhood of ∗∗
 the function
 ()d e ﬁn e di n( 5 7 )s a t i s ﬁes the properties: ()=
 ()a n d() ≥ 
 (). As noted
above, moreover, the function  ()i sd i ﬀerentiable and concave in ; its derivative is equal to
−(1 + )[1+
 ()], where 
 () is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint (0
())=
0 in (57) at . It again follows from Theorem 4.10 of Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) that
()i sd i ﬀerentiable at ∗∗









 )]. The derivative is the same as above, with the diﬀerence that at ∗∗
 we have

 () = 0. So (55) is equal to (60) at ∗∗
 . ¥
We can now show:





Proof. From the deﬁnition of ,w ek n o wt h a ti f and  are diﬀerentiable at  it must be
t h ec a s et h a t
 = − 0
() (61)
48Assume ﬁrst that  

. Then, by Lemma A.6, (61) would imply  = 1, a contradiction.
Assume next that  

. This would imply that for each cost state ,w eh a v et h a t () 

.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions for 

 and the expressions in Lemma A.6, we can show that this
implies  0
()  −. This implies: − 0





] as claimed. ¥
We can use this result to establish the assertion in the proposition that   
















Multiplying this inequality through by 1 +  yields the result.
6.5.2 Proof of countercyclical behavior
We begin with the following useful result.
Lemma A.8. For all  ∈ [

] it is the case that ()  (),w h e r e() is the Lagrange














2 +  ln + 0(0)
 (0) ≥ 0,  +
()





Proof. Let  ∈ [

]. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that () ≥ (). Then, by the
concavity of the value function, we know that 0
() ≥ 0
(). Following the same basic steps as
in the proof of Lemma A.4, we can show that:
(()) − ()  (()) − () (62)
Since  ≥ 

, moreover, we know that ()  0 and hence that the budget constraint is binding
in the high cost state. Thus, if (62) holds, we have
(()) − ()+0
() − (1 + ) (()) − ()+0
() − (1 + ) =0 
This implies () = 0. So we have ()  (), a contradiction. ¥
We now prove:
49Lemma A.9. In equilibrium: (i) 0
() for all  ∈ [), and, (ii) 0
() for all  ∈ [ )
and 0
() for all  ∈ (].
Proof (i) We need to show that 0
() for all  ∈ [). Let  ∈ [). Suppose ﬁrst that
 ≤ 

. Then, we have that 0
()= ≥ 

  . Suppose next that 

.W e k n o w t h a t
0
()   and that 0




where () is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint on the maximization problem














() ≤ .T h e ni f ≥ 

,w eh a v et h a t
1+()=− 0
(0
()) ≤−  0
()=(1 + ()) + (1 − )(1 + ())  1+()
since ()  () for all  ≥ 

 by Lemma A.8. If 

,w eh a v et h a t
1+()=− 0
(0
()) ≤−  0
()=(1 + ()) + (1 − )  1+()
(ii) We ﬁrst show that 0
() for all  ∈ [ ). Let  ∈ [ ). Then since  

,w ek n o w
that 0
()=  .W en e x ts h o wt h a t0
() for all  ∈ (]. Let  ∈ (]. Suppose ﬁrst
that  ≤ 

. Then we know that 0
()=  .N o ws u p p o s et h a t

. We know that 0
()





() ≥ .T h e ns i n c e

 we have that
1+()=− 0
(0
()) ≥−  0
()=(1 + ()) + (1 − )(1 + ())  1+()
where the last step relies on (63) and the fact that by Lemma A.8 ()  (). This is a
contradiction. ¥
506.5.3 The stable distribution
Let () denote the distribution function of the current level of debt at the beginning of period
. The distribution function 0() is exogenous and is determined by the economy’s initial level










for any 0 ∈ []. (0) is the probability that in the next period the initial level of debt
will be less than or equal to 0 ∈ []i ft h ec u r r e n tl e v e lo fd e b ti s. Using this notation,
the distribution of debt at the beginning of any period  ≥ 1i sd e ﬁned inductively by ()=
R
 ()−1(). The sequence of distributions h()i converges to the distribution ()i fw e





We now establish that any sequence of equilibrium debt distributions h()i converges to a unique
invariant distribution ∗().
It is easy to prove that the transition function (0) has the Feller Property and that it
is monotonic in  (see Ch. 8.1 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for deﬁnitions). Deﬁne the
function (0) inductively by 0(0)=(0)a n d(0)=
R
 (0)−1(). By
Theorem 12.12 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), therefore, the result follows if the following
“mixing condition” is satisﬁed:
Mixing Condition: There exists an 0 and  ≥ 0,s u c ht h a t() ≥  and ( ) ≤
1 − .
We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that there exists an 0a n d ≥ 0, such that () ≥ .A s s u m e
by contradiction that (

) = 0 for any . Then the political equilibrium coincides with the
planner’s solution, since with probability one: (0
()0
() 0
()) = 0. By the argument













= 0, a contradiction. So there must be an 0a n d ≥ 0,
such that −1(

)  . This implies () ≥ (1 − )−1(

)  0.
51Step 2. W en o ws h o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa n0a n d ≥ 0, such that 1 − ( ) ≥ .W i t h
probability −1(

)t h el e v e lo fd e b tc h o s e ni np e r i o d − 1i s

 when the initial level of





 )]. By the previous step and the monotonicity of (0)w eh a v e
that there is a 0 such that −1(





,w eh a v e0
 (

) ≥ : it follows




) ≥   0.
To prove that the stable distribution has full support in [) we now show that for any
 ∈ [), ∗() ∈ (01). The fact that ∗()  0, follows from Step 1 presented above. We






.D e ﬁne recursively a sequence 
such that  = (−1). This sequence is monotonically increasing and bounded, so it converges.
Assume that lim→∞  = ∞  . W eh a v et h a t0
() ≤  + ,w h e r e  0a n d → 0a s
 →∞ . We therefore have:
1+() ≤−  0
( + ) (64)
= (1 + ( + )) + (1 − )(1 + ( + ))
 1+( + ) − (1 − )∆∗
where the last inequality follows from the fact that by Lemma A.8 ()  () for all  ∈
[ ∞], so there is a ∆∗  0s ot h a t()−∆∗  () in a left neighborhood of ∞. But since
() is continuous in , (64) implies (∞)  (∞) − (1 − )∆∗, a contradiction.
The argument above implies that for any ,t h e r ei saﬁnite  such that starting from any
0 ≥ ,w eh a v e with strictly positive probability. This implies that ∗()  1. ¥
6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Given the discussion in the text, it suﬃces to establish three properties of the equilibrium revenue
requirements. These are (i) that ()i si n c r e a s i n gi n for each state , (ii) that () 

,
and () ≤ 

, and (iii) that ()  ∗
.T o s e e t h e ﬁrst property, assume ﬁrst that  ≤


.I n t h i s c a s e 0
()=,s o()=( 1 + ) − 0
()i si n c r e a s i n gi n.A s s u m e n o w t h a t


. Then we know that (() () 0
()) = 0, implying that (1 + ) − 0
()=
(()) − (). An increase in  implies that () increases, implying that (()) −
()i n c r e a s e si n. The second property follows from Lemma A.7. For the third property,
note that 0
()= and so ()=.G i v e n t h e d e ﬁnition of , the government budget
52constraint implies that (() ()) = (120). Since there is no public sector employment,
total employment is therefore
(12)

= ( − )2
This is less than  by assumption (see footnote #15). It follows that ()  ∗
. ¥
6.7 Proof of the results of Section 4.3
We need to prove that 
 is smaller than 
−
 () if and only if (26) is satisﬁed. As in the proof of
Proposition 1, let ∗
 denote the tax rate at which the slope of the budget line is equal to the slope
of the full employment line and let ∗
() denote the level of public good that satisﬁes the budget
constraint (32) given this tax rate. Moreover, deﬁne ∗∗
 to be that revenue requirement at which
the point (∗
∗
()) is tangent to the full employment line. Then, for all  ∈ (
 ∗∗













.B yd e ﬁnition, we also know that for
all  ∈ (
 ∗∗
 ], 




 ()]. Thus, 
 is smaller than 
−






 is larger than 
+
 () for all  ∈ (
 ∗∗
 ]i f
 is larger than ∗
. Knowing
whether 
 is smaller or larger than ∗
 is equivalent to knowing whether 
 is larger or smaller
than ∗
(∗∗
 ). We know 
 from (30), so we just need to compute ∗
(∗∗
 ). By deﬁnition, the tax
rate ∗









which implies that ∗
 =
−2
2(−). We know that the revenue requirement ∗∗
 is such that the
associated budget line is just tangent to the resource constraint at tax rate ∗





















( − )2 +4  − 
2
(68)
and we have 
 is larger or smaller than ∗
(∗∗
 )a s is larger or smaller than 
2
³
 − 
2
´
as
required. ¥
53